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Introduction
Last developments in EU climate policy
In December 2015 at COP21, the EU is committed to a binding
target of an at least 40% domestic reduction in GHG emissions by
2030 compared to 1990
In June 2016, the UK voted to leave the European Union
In July 2016, the EC presented its proposal for a regulation to
reduce GHG emissions in sectors not covered by the emissions
trading system (ETS) with regards to post-2020 binding targets
called Effort Sharing Decision (ESD)
Questions:
1 What are resulting cost by Member States of this EU Effort Sharing
Decision ?
2 What are the impact of the Brexit on the UK and European climate
policies ?
EU effort sharing decision and hard Brexit
A noncooperative dynamic game
Assumptions:
1 A safety emissions budget Bud is distributed among the Member States. Let
θj ∈ (0, 1) be the share of Member State j , with
∑m
j=1 θj = 1.
2 A competitive market for emissions permits, which clears at each period. Let
ωtj be the vector of permits for Member State j at period t.
Model: Then we consider the game where each Member State j controls the permit
allocations schedule (ωtj : t = 0, . . . ,T − 1) with Ωt =
∑m
j=1 ω
t
j and tries to achieve
min
ωj
{
T−1∑
t=0
βtj (Φ
t
j (e
t
j (Ω
t)) + pt(Ωt)(etj (Ω
t)− ωtj ))
}
,
subject to actions chosen by the other Member States and under the budget sharing
constraint
T−1∑
t=0
ωtj ≤ θjBud. (1)
Here Φtj (e
t
j ) represents the cost of abatement with respect to emissions by Member
State j , at time t and βtj a discount factor
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Numerical implementation and further assumptions
Time horizon 2011-2050, 4 decades 2011-2020, 2020-2030,
2030-2040, 2040-2050
Bud=99 Gt CO2; Reference scenario = 173 Gt CO2
Φtj (e
t
j ) are estimated from 200 runs of the CGE GEMINI-E3
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We assume full flexibility between ETS and non ETS (one-off
flexibility option)
We assume trading between non ETS sectors (inter-Member State
flexibility)
We assume inter-temporal flexibility between decades
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Effort Sharing Decision rule
EC already defined ESD per Member State for years 2020 and 2030
We have to define ESD for the whole period (2011-2050)
CO2 emissions targets: 2020 = -20%, 2030=-40%, 2050=-80%
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Effort Sharing Decision rule
EC already defined ESD per Member State for years 2020 and 2030
We have to define ESD for the whole period (2011-2050)
CO2 emissions targets: 2020 = -20%, 2030=-40%, 2050=-80%
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EU28 scenario
Computing the share of budget allowed to MS j : θj
We already defined θESDj the burden sharing for non ETS
emissions
We compute the θj with the following equation:
θj =
γjθ
ESD
j Bud+(1−γj )
∑
t e
t TAX
j
ψ
Bud
, (2)
where
et TAXj , the emissions in an uniform tax scenario
γj is the share of emissions in non-ETS sectors
ψ a normalization factor (equal to 1.04)
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Welfare cost in relation to GDP per capita
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Welfare cost: discounted welfare cost in % of discounted household consumption
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UK and climate change policy
UK was the second-largest European GHG emitter, with 518 Mt
CO2-eq emitted, representing 13.1% of EU28 emissions
UK was the first G20 country to adopt legislation on GHG emissions
According to the UK government about 1,000 power stations and
industrial plants in the UK participate in the EU ETS
UK Climate Change Act established a mandate of an 80% cut in
GHG emissions by 2050
As pointed out by Lord Nicholas Stern: “The UKs commitment on
climate change is longstanding and based on a understanding that it
is global issue and should not be altered by its future departure from
the European Union”
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EU climate change policy and Brexit options
We consider two options:
Hard Brexit: no access to EU emissions trading
Third access status: UK participates to the EU emissions trading
but without ESD (i.e. UK budget = UK domestic commitment)
EU28 Hard Third
Brexit access
status
UK budget (Mt CO2) 13’807
UK discounted welfare cost† 1.57
Abatement cost 1.55
Permit trading 0.18
Gains from terms of trade -0.16
Change in welfare cost (billion US $) –
EU discounted welfare cost† 1.17
†in % of discounted household consumption
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EU climate change policy and Brexit options
We consider two options:
Hard Brexit: no access to EU emissions trading
Third access status: UK participates to the EU emissions trading
but without ESD (i.e. UK budget = UK domestic commitment)
EU28 Hard Third
Brexit access
status
UK budget (Mt CO2) 13’807 13’693
UK discounted welfare cost† 1.57 1.65
Abatement cost 1.55 1.81
Permit trading 0.18 –
Gains from terms of trade -0.16 -0.16
Change in welfare cost (billion US $) – -43
EU discounted welfare cost† 1.17 1.06
†in % of discounted household consumption
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EU climate change policy and Brexit options
We consider two options:
Hard Brexit: no access to EU emissions trading
Third access status: UK participates to the EU emissions trading
but without ESD (i.e. UK budget = UK domestic commitment)
EU28 Hard Third
Brexit access
status
UK budget (Mt CO2) 13’807 13’693 13’693
UK discounted welfare cost† 1.57 1.65 1.63
Abatement cost 1.55 1.81 1.55
Permit trading 0.18 – 0.24
Gains from terms of trade -0.16 -0.16 -0.16
Change in welfare cost (billion US $) – -43 -34
EU discounted welfare cost† 1.17 1.06 1.17
†in % of discounted household consumption
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Conclusion
Using a meta-game approach it is possible to analyse the ESD
With the ESD, high-income European countries pay for low-income
European countries
A hard Brexit would induce a welfare cost of UK climate policy (≈
43 billion US $)
A soft brexit (i.e. a “third access status”) would moderate UK cost
(≈ 34 billion US $)
Within the Brexit scenarios MSs that are net sellers of permits (new
Ms) suffer from less revenue and, in contrast, net buyers experience
some benefits
Brexit reinforces the leadership of Germany that accounts now for
1/4 of CO2 European emissions
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